We analyze in…nitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games with imperfect private monitoring, and construct sequential equilibria where strategies are measurable with respect to players' beliefs regarding their opponents' continuation strategies. We show that, when monitoring is almost perfect, the symmetric e¢cient outcome can be approximated in any prisoners' dilemma game, while every individually rational feasible payo¤ can be approximated in a class of prisoner dilemma games. We also extend the approximate e¢ciency result to n-player prisoners' dilemma games and to prisoner's dilemma games with more general information structure. Our results require that monitoring be su¢ciently accurate but do not require very low discounting.
principle of dynamic programming. By doing so, we prove that one can approximate the symmetric e¢cient payo¤ in any prisoners' dilemma game provided that the monitoring is su¢ciently accurate. Furthermore, for a class of prisoners' dilemma games, one can approximate every individually rational feasible payo¤. Our e¢ciency results also generalize to the n player case, where we show that the symmetric e¢cient payo¤ can similarly be approximated.
These results are closely related to an important paper by Sekiguchi [13] , who shows that one can approximate the e¢cient payo¤ in two-player prisoners' dilemma games provided that the monitoring is su¢ciently accurate. Sekiguchi's result applies for a class of prisoners' dilemma payo¤s, and relied on the construction of a Nash equilibrium which achieves approximate e¢ciency. The results in this paper can be viewed as an extension and generalization of the approach taken in Sekiguchi's paper.
Our substantive results are also related to those obtained in recent papers by Piccione [12] and Ely and Välimäki [5] , which adopt a very di¤erent approach. The current paper (and Sekiguchi's) utilizes initial randomization to ensure that a player's beliefs adjust so that she has the incentive to punish or reward her opponent(s) as is appropriate. The Piccione-Ely-Välimäki approach on the other hand relies on making each player indi¤erent between her di¤erent actions at most information sets, so that her beliefs do not matter 1 . We defer a more detailed discussion of the two approaches to the concluding section of this paper.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 constructs sequential equilibria which approximate the e¢cient outcome in the two-player case, while section 3 approximates the set of individually rational feasible payo¤s in this case. Section 4 shows that the e¢ciency result can be generalized to n player prisoners' dilemma games. The …nal section concludes.
Approximating the E¢cient Payo¤
We consider the prisoners' dilemma with the stage game payo¤s given above, where the row indicates the player's own action and the column indicates her opponent's action. Players only observe their own actions, and also observe a private signal which is informative about their opponent's action. This signal belongs to the set -= fc; dg; where c (resp. d) is more likely when the opponent plays C (resp. D). The signalling structure is assumed symmetric, in the sense that the probability of errors does not depend on the action pro…le played. Given any action pro…le a = (a 1 ; a 2 ); a i 2 A = fC; Dg; the probability that exactly one player receives a wrong signal is " > 0, and the probability that both receive wrong signals is » > 0: Players maximize the expected sum of stage game payo¤s discounted at rate ±: We also assume that at the end of each period, players observe the realization of a public randomization device uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Our approach is closely related to Sekiguchi's [13] : we show that one can construct a mixed trigger strategy sequential equilibrium which achieves partial cooperation. With public randomization or by "dividing up the game" as in Ellison [4] , one can modify the strategy appropriately in order to approximate full cooperation. Our approach involves the construction of a "belief-based" strategy, i.e. a strategy which is a function of the player's beliefs about his opponent's continuation strategy. This results in a major simpli…cation as compared to the more conventional notion of a strategy which is a function of the private information of the player.
We begin by de…ning partial continuation strategies. In any period t; de…ne the partial continuation strategy ¾ D as follows: play D at period t; and at period t + 1 play ¾ D if the realized outcomes in period t are (Dc) or (Dd): De…ne the partial continuation strategy ¾ C as follows: in any period t play C; at period t + 1 play ¾ C if the realized outcomes in period t is (Cc); and play ¾ D if the realized outcome at t is (Cd): We call ¾ C and ¾ D a partial continuation strategy since each of these fully speci…es the player's actions in every subsequent period at every information set that arises given that he con…rms to the strategy: In consequence, the (random) path and payo¤s induced by any pair of partial continuation strategies is well de…ned. However, a partial continuation strategy does not specify the player's actions in the event that she deviates from the strategy at some information set. This is deliberate, since our purpose is to construct the full strategies that constitute a sequential equilibrium. Note also that for any player i; only the partial continuation strategy of player j is relevant when computing i's payo¤s in any equilibrium.
Let V ab (±; "; »); a; b 2 fC; Dg denote the repeated game payo¤ of ¾ a against ¾ b -these payo¤s are well de…ned since the path induced by each pair is well de…ned. We have that V DD > V CD ; for all parameter values. Furthermore, if ± > g 1+g ; and (" + ») is su¢ciently small, then V CC > V DC : Suppose that player i believes that her opponent is playing either ¾ C or ¾ D ; and is playing ¾ C with probability ¹: Then the di¤erence between the payo¤ from playing ¾ C and the payo¤ from playing ¾ D is given by ¢V (¹; ±; "; ») = ¹(
Hence ¢V (¹) is increasing and linear in ¹ and there is a unique value, ¼(±; "; »); at which it is zero. Suppose now that at t = 1 both players are restricted to choosing between ¾ C and ¾ D : There is a mixed equilibrium of the restricted game, where each player plays the strategy ¾ which plays ¾ D with probability 1 ¡ ¼ and ¾ C with probability ¼: Call this partial mixed strategy ¾: Note that ¼(±; "; ») increases to 1 as we decrease ± towards its lower bound g 1+g : Let ± be such that ¼ > For future reference we emphasize that equation (1) applies to any period -if a player believes that her opponent's continuation strategy is ¾ C with probability ¹ and ¾ D with probability 1 ¡ ¹; then she prefers ¾ C to ¾ D if ¹ > ¼ and prefers ¾ D to ¾ C if ¹ < ¼: Note also that if a player's opponent begins at t = 1 with a strategy in f¾ C ; ¾ D g; her continuation strategy also belongs to this set, since ¾ D induces only ¾ D ; while ¾ C may induce either ¾ C or ¾ D ; depending upon the private history that the opponent has observed.
We de…ne the following four belief revision operators. Starting with any initial belief ¹; we can de…ne a player's new beliefs when she takes action a and receives signal !: Her new belief (i.e. the probability that j's continuation strategy is ¾ C ) will be given by Â a! (¹): We have four belief operators, Â Cc ; Â Cd ; Â Dc ; Â Dd ; where each Â a! : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is de…ned, using Bayes rule, as follows
Starting with any initial belief1 at the beginning of the game, a player's belief at any private history, i.e. after an arbitrary sequence h(a!) r i t r=1 ; can be computed by iterated application of the appropriate belief operators. Let ¥(1) be the set of possible beliefs, i.e. ¹ 2 ¥(1) , 9 < ¹ r > t r=1 : ¹ 1 =1, ¹ t = ¹ and ¹ r+1 = Â (a!)r (¹ r ); (a!) r 2 A £ -; 1 · r · t ¡ 1: Let ¿ be a (full) strategy, which is de…ned at every information set, i.e. after arbitrary private histories. Clearly, ¿ is a best response to ¾ after every private history if and only if it is optimal to play ¿ at every belief ¹ 2 ¥(p); i.e. at all possible beliefs given the initial belief p:
We now examine the properties of these belief operators. First, each is a strictly increasing function: The operator Â Cc has an interior …xed point at µ; and Â Cc (¹) 7 ¹ as ¹ ? µ. The value of µ depends upon ("; ») in the following way
We shall assume that maxf"; »g < ; which in turn entails that µ > We now show Â a! (¹) < ¹ for each of the other three belief operators, Â Cd ; Â Dc and Â Dd , provided that maxf"; »g < 1 6 : To verify this, take any typical expression from (3)- (5), and divide by ¹: This yields " (or ») in the numerator, while the denominator is strictly larger since it is a convex combination of ("+») and (1 ¡ " ¡ »):
Since ¹ < µ ) Â a! (¹) < µ for any belief operator, this immediately implies that if ¼ < µ; ¥(¼) µ [0; µ): This follows from the fact that the initial belief p is strictly less than µ; and since we have demonstrated that no point ¹ 0 > µ is the image of any ¹ · µ under any belief operator.
Hence, provided that initial beliefs are given by ¼ < µ; it su¢ces to de…ne our belief based strategy for beliefs in the set [0; µ]: Let ½ : [0; µ] ! fC; D; ¼g be de…ned as follows:
e. ½ plays C with probability ¼ and D with probability 1 ¡ ¼: Hence the pair (½; ¼), i.e. ½ in conjunction with an initial belief ¼ · µ, speci…es an action at every possible belief, and hence a complete strategy.
The advantage of this speci…cation is that a player's continuation strategy is speci…ed even at information sets which arise due to a player's deviating from ½ in the past. The belief based strategy (¼; ½) is realization equivalent to the partial strategy ¾ if it induces the same probability distribution over actions at every private history. This reduces to the following condition: and (" + ») ! 0; while ¼(±; "; ») ! 0 if ± ! 1 and (" + ») ! 0: Henceforth we shall assume that ± is such that ¼ 2 (
We have therefore established that the pair (½; ¼) de…nes a full strategy which is behaviorally equivalent to ¾: Proof. Note …rst that if ¹ = ¼; a player is indi¤erent between playing ¾ C and ¾ D ; and hence a one-step deviation from playing ½ is not pro…table. Since the payo¤s from playing ¾; ¾ C and ¾ D are equal at belief ¼; one may also, for the purposes of computing payo¤s, use ¾ C or ¾ D as is computationally convenient in the event of belief ¼:
Consider …rst the case when ¹ > ¼: A one-step deviation from ½ is to play D; and to continue with ½ in the next period. The following sub-cases arise: a) Suppose that Â Dc (¹) · ¼ and Â Dd (¹) · ¼: In this case, a one-step deviation from ½ is to play ¾ D ; whereas ½(¹) = ¾ C : However, (1) establishes that in this case ¾ C is preferable to ¾ D ; and hence a one-step deviation from ½ is unpro…table. b) Suppose that Â Dc (¹) · ¼ and Â Dd (¹) > ¼, so that the one-step deviation is to play D today and continue with ¾ D if Dc is reached, and to continue with ¾ C if Dd is reached. Let ¢Ṽ (¹) be payo¤ di¤erence between the equilibrium strategy and the one-step deviation. Note that the one step deviation di¤ers from ¾ D only at the information set Dd; at this information it continues by playing ¾ C whereas ¾ D continues with ¾ D : Hence we can write ¢Ṽ (¹) as the payo¤ di¤erence between ¾ C and ¾ D minus the payo¤ di¤erence between ¾ C and ¾ D conditional on Dd being reached, as follows:
Note that Â Dd (¹) < ¹: Equation (1) shows that this implies that ¢V (¹) > ¢V (Â Dd (¹)): Since the coe¢cient multiplying ¢V (Â Dd (¹)) is strictly less than one, this implies that ¢Ṽ (¹) > 0: Hence if ¹ > ¼; a one-step deviation is unpro…table.
c) Finally, we establish that Â Dc (¹) < ¼ 8 ¹ · µ; so that no other sub-case need be considered. Evaluating Â Dc at the upper bound µ; we have
where the last step follows from the assumption that maxf"; »g < 1 6 : Consider now the case when ¹ < ¼: In this case, a one-step deviation from ½ is to play C today, and to continue with ¾ C if Â Cc (¹)¸¼; but to continue with ¾ D if Â Cc (¹) < ¼: (Note that ¹ < ¼ ) Â Cd (¹) < ¼; so the continuation strategies do not di¤er in this event.) In the …rst sub-case, the one-step deviation from ½ corresponds to playing ¾ C , and (1) establishes that in this case ¾ D is preferable to ¾ C ; and hence a one-step deviation from ½ is unpro…table. In the second sub-case, the one-step deviation di¤ers from ¾ C only at the information set Cc -it plays ¾ D at this information set rather than ¾ C : Let ¢V (¹) denote the payo¤ di¤erence between the one-step deviation and the equilibrium strategy ¾ D : We have
Since ¼ > Â Cc (¹) > ¹; ¢V (¹) < ¢V (Â Cc (¹)) < 0: Also, the coe¢cient multiplying ¢V (Â Cc (¹)) is less than 1 which establishes that ¢V (¹) > 0:
We have therefore established that if a player's opponent j plays the strategy ¾ (which randomizes between ¾ C and ¾ D ); it is optimal for player i to play ½; with initial belief ¼: However, (½; ¼) is consistent and behaviorally equivalent to the strategy ¾: Hence the pro…le where both players play (½; ¼) is a sequential equilibrium.
Under what conditions is there a pure strategy sequential equilibrium where both players begin in period one by playing ¾ C with probability one. The above analysis also permits an answer to this question, with the di¤erence that the initial belief1 = 1 rather than ¼: To ensure that it is always optimal to cooperate after receiving good signals, we require that Â k Cc (1) > ¼ 8k, which will be satis…ed as long as ¼ · µ: Additionally, it must be optimal to switch to playing D on receiving a bad signal, i.e. we must have
Hence it is necessary and su¢cient that
This requires that the Â Cd function always lies below µ; which requires the inequality
This inequality will be satis…ed if " is su¢ciently small relative to »; i.e. if signals are su¢ciently "positively" correlated. It is easily veri…ed that this inequality cannot be satis…ed if signals are independent or "negatively" correlated so that the equilibrium must be in mixed strategies.
Note that ¼ plays a dual role in the construction of the mixed strategy equilibrium. On the one hand it is the randomization probability in the …rst period, and on the other hand, it is simply a number which de…nes the threshold at which behavior changes. These roles are obviously distinct, as is apparent from our discussion of the pure strategy equilibrium. This distinction is particularly relevant when we discuss the folk theorem in the following section.
With the construction of the mixed equilibrium, one can approximate full cooperation by using one of two devices. If a public randomization device is available, then it is immediate that the equilibrium payo¤ set is monotonically increasing (in the sense of set inclusion) in ± -given any ± 0 > ±; players may simply re-start the game with probability m = ± ± 0 : In the absence of such public randomization, one may use the construction introduced by Ellison [4] (see also, Sekiguchi [13] ), of dividing the game into n separate repeated games, thereby reducing the discount factor.
Lemma 4 Let ± 0 < ± 1 < 1; and let there be a symmetric strategy pro…le which is a sequential equilibrium of the repeated game for any ± 2 ( ± 0 ; ± 1 ); yielding payo¤ v(±)¸v for any ± 2 ( ± 0 ; ± 1 ): There exists± < 1 such that the repeated game has a symmetric sequential equilibrium with payo¤ greater than v for any ±¸± . If a public randomization device is available and (v 1 ; v 2 ) is a sequential equilibrium payo¤ for some ± 2 (0; 1); it is also an equilibrium payo¤ for any ± 0 > ±:
Proof. For the proof of the …rst part of this lemma, see Ellison [4] . To prove the second part, let ¿ be the strategy pro…le giving the required payo¤ given ±:
Players play a sequence of games: they begin with the strategy pro…le ¿ : If the sunspot in any period Á > m; they play a new game and re-start with ¿ :
Proposition 5 For any x < 1; there exists a symmetric sequential equilibrium with payo¤ greater than x if " and » are su¢ciently small, provided that either ( i) ± is su¢ciently close to 1 or (ii) ± > g 1+g and a public randomization device is available.
Proof. Proposition 3 implies that if ("; ») are su¢ciently small, so that µ("; ») is close to 1; we have an open interval of values of ¼ such that (¼; ½) is a sequential equilibrium. In this range, ¼(±; "; ») is a strictly decreasing function of ±; and hence if ("; ») are su¢ciently small, there is an open interval of values of ± such that (¼(±; "; »); ½) is a sequential equilibrium. Since ("; ») are close to zero, we can select this interval of values of ¼ close to 1; so that the payo¤ in any such equilibrium is greater than x: Part (i) of the proposition then follows from the …rst part of lemma 4. If a public randomization device is available, let ("; ») ! (0; 0) and ±("; ») ! g (1+g) ; so that ¼ ! 1: The equilibrium payo¤ tends to one. Lemma 4 ensures that this result holds for all ± > g 1+g :
Although it is common to allow for vanishing discounting in proving folk theorems in repeated games, it is worth pointing out that in order to obtain approximate e¢ciency, such vanishing discounting is not required if we have a public randomization device. In the absence of such a randomization device, one does require vanishing discounting, essentially due to an "integer" problem.
Generalizing the information structure.
We now show that the above construction also extends for a more general information structure. Let -be a common …nite set of signals observed by the players, and assume that the marginal distribution of p has full support, i.e. for any action pro…le a; P (
Our assumptions on the signal structure are as follows:
1. Assume that the set -can be partitioned into the set of good signals -c and the set of bad signals -d ; where the likelihood ratios satisfy
for every c 2 -c ; d 2 -d and for any action a 1 2 fC; Dg taken by player 1:
Although we focus on player 1, the same conditions and results also hold for player 2.
2. Assume that -C £ -C is 1 ¡ " evident given the action pro…le (CC) ; where " is a small number. This ensures that if player 1 receives any good signal, and her prior belief assigns high probability to the action pro…le (CC); then player 1 assigns high probability to the event that her opponent has also received a good signal. Note that this assumption is consistent with signals being independent conditional upon the action pro…le -under independence,
be bounded below by some number´> 0; independent of ": Assume also that max
Note that assumptions 1-3 above are consistent with the signals being independent conditional upon the strategy pro…le. Also note that this information structure can be quite di¤erent from almost perfect monitoring.
We now show that under these assumptions, beliefs evolve in such a way that they are always above the initial belief ¼ as long as a player plays C and receives good signals in -c ; but they fall below ¼ whenever a player receives a bad signal and they continue to stay below ¼ when a player plays D:
When player 1 plays C and receives some signal c 2 -c ; the updated belief is given by
The …xed point of this mapping will be close to 1 for every c 2 -C if
The second condition is that a player should switch to playing ¾ D when he receives a bad signal. For each c 2 -c ; we can de…ne the associated …xed point of the mapping (14), just as in (6) . Let ¹ µ denote the largest such …xed point (in the set -c ) and let µ denote the smallest such …xed point. A su¢cient condition for our construction is that Â Cd (µ) < µ for any d 2 -d : In this case one can select ¼ 2 ( Â Cd (µ); µ) so that switching to ¾ D is optimal: Since µ ! 1 as " ! 0; and µ 5 max
; we need that
) is bounded away from 1 independent of ": A straightforward application of the belief operators shows that:
which is bounded away from 1 by assumption 2 above. Finally, we need to ensure that Â D!1 (¹) remains low, so that a player continues with playing
is less than 1 ¡´0; and bounded away from 1 for any -c by assumption 3: Hence it is optimal to continue with ¾ D once a player starts playing D:
Summarizing the above arguments and checking sequential rationality, we have the following theorem:
Proposition 6 Given´;´0 > 0; there exists " > 0 such that for any " < "; our mixed trigger strategy
is a sequential equilibrium. If " ! 0 we can approximate the e¢ciency outcome provided that either i) ± ! 1 or ii) ± > g 1+g and a public randomization device is available.
Approximating Any Individually Rational Feasible Payo¤
We now build on the construction of the previous section and show how to approximate any individually rational feasible payo¤. We shall consider a prisoners' dilemma game where the symmetric e¢cient payo¤ is given by the pro…le (C; C) (rather than by a convex combination of (C; D) and (D; C)); and we also assume that there are only two signals, c and d: We also assume in this section that a public randomization device is available. The key step is to approximate the payo¤ ( 1+g+l 1+l ; 0), which is player 1's maximal payo¤ within the set of individually rational and feasible payo¤s. Since the payo¤ (1; 1) has already been approximated in the previous section, and (0; 0) is a stage game equilibrium payo¤, one can then use public randomization to approximate any individually rational feasible payo¤.
It might be useful to outline the basic construction and to explain the complications that arise. The basic idea in approximating the extremal asymmetric payo¤ is that play begins in the asymmetric phase where player 1 plays D and player 2 randomizes, playing C with a high probability, À. This asymmetric phase continues or ends, depending upon the realization of a public randomization device. Thus player 1's per-period payo¤ in the asymmetric phase is approximately 1 + g while player 2's per-period payo¤ is approximately ¡l:
Since the latter is less than the individually rational payo¤ for player 2, he must be rewarded for playing C: To ensure this, when the asymmetric phase ends, both player's continuation strategies depend upon their private information. Player 1 continues with ¾ C if he has observed the signal c in the last period (i.e. if his information is Dc)and continues with ¾ D if she has observed d (i.e. if his information is Dd): This ensures that player 2 is rewarded for playing C in the asymmetric phase. Similarly, player 2 continues with ¾ C if his private information is Cd; the information set which is most likely when he plays C;and continues with ¾ D if his private information is Dd: Hence, if the noise is small, player 2's continuation payo¤ when the asymmetric phase ends is approximately 1 if he has played C in the previous period and approximately zero if he has played D: Hence if ± is large relative to l (± > l 1+l ); we can, by choosing the value of the sunspot appropriately, make player 2 indi¤erent between C and D in the asymmetric phase. The payo¤s in this equilibrium converge to ( 1+g+l 1+l ; 0) as the noise vanishes.
However, one must also verify that the players …nd it optimal to play ¾ C and ¾ D , as appropriate, at each information set after the end of the asymmetric phase. A complication arises here, as compared to the previous section, since player 1 does not randomize in the asymmetric phase, i.e. she plays D for sure. (Indeed, she cannot play C with positive probability, since in that case her payo¤ in the asymmetric phase is bounded above by 1 and hence cannot approximate 1 + g): 4 Hence when player 2 receives the signal c; he knows that there has been at least one error in signals, and his beliefs about player 1's continuation strategy depend upon the relative probability of one (") versus two errors (»). In other words, his continuation strategy at the information sets Cc and Dc depends upon the correlation structure of signals. Since player 2's continuation strategy depends upon this correlation structure, this implies that player 1's beliefs also depend upon the correlation structure.
We adopt two alternative approaches to handle this problem. First, we show that if signals are positively correlated, so that the probability of two errors is at least as large as the probability of one error, then one can approximate the asymmetric payo¤, without any restriction upon payo¤s. Second, we show that one does not need such positive correlation of signals provided that one can choose ± so that ¼(±; "; ») su¢ciently close to one. This result applies to any prisoners' dilemma game where g¸l -in any such game one can approximate the asymmetric payo¤ arbitrarily closely. However, this second approach does not work if l > g, since in this case one cannot have ¼(±; "; ») ! 1: The reason for this is the for ¼ to be close to 1, we must have ± ! g 1+g : However, in the asymmetric phase, player 2 incurs a loss of l by playing C; whereas his continuation payo¤ gain is no more than 1: Hence player 2 will be willing to play C in the asymmetric phase only if ± > l 1+l : Hence if l > g, one cannot have ¼ close to 1 since ± is bounded away from g 1+g : We make the following assumption for this section:
Assumption A: Either A1: »¸" or A2: g¸l and »(1¡»)(1¡3"¡2») > " 3 :
Note that A1 is a relatively strong assumption that signals are positively correlated, but does not require any assumption on payo¤s. On the other hand, A2 requires an assumption on payo¤s but is a mild assumption about the relative probability of errors. It is always satis…ed if signals are positively correlated, or independent. In the independent signal case, the left hand side is a term of order " whereas the right hand side is a term of order " 3 : Hence A2 is satis…ed even if signals are negatively correlated provided that they are not too highly so.
We now de…ne the players' strategies more precisely. In any period t¡1 in the asymmetric phase, player 1 plays D for sure, while player 2 randomizes between C and D; choosing C with a constant probability À which is close to 1. At the end of period, players observe the realization, Á t¡1 , of a sunspot which is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]: If Á t¡1 > 1 ¡¸; both players continue in the asymmetric phase for the next period. If Á t¡1 ·¸; the asymmetric phase ends for both players, and is never reached again. In this case, players' continuation strategies (i.e. their states) depend upon the realization of their private information at date t¡1 (i.e. players ignore their private information from previous dates). Let º t¡1 denote the player's private information realization at date t ¡ 1: Player 1 continues with ¾ C if º t¡1 = Dc; if º t¡1 = Dd; she continues in period t with ¾ D : 5 Player 2's continues with ¾ C if º t¡1 = Cd; and continues with ¾ D if º t¡1 = Dd: If º t¡1 2 fCc; Dcg; player 2 continues with ¾ C if ¹ 2 (º t¡1 ) > ¼(±; "; ») and with
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we show that player 2 is willing to randomize in the asymmetric phase provided that¸is appropriately chosen, and that the payo¤s associated with this class of equilibria tend to ( 1+g+l 1+l ; 0) as the noise vanishes. Subsequently, we shall demonstrate that all players are choosing optimally at every information set.
Write W 2 (D) for the payo¤ of player 2 in the asymmetric phase given that he plays D; and W 2 (C) for the payo¤ in the asymmetric phase from playing C.
where V 2 (D) is the expected payo¤ to player 2 conditional on the fact that the asymmetric phase has ended and that he has played D: Similarly, letting V 2 (C) be the expected payo¤ to 2 conditional on the fact that the asymmetric phase has ended and that he has played C; we have
Clearly, V 2 (D) ! 0 as ("; ») ! (0; 0): We now show that V 2 (C) ! 1 as ("; ») ! (0; 0):Let V 2 (Cd) (resp. V 2 (Cc)) denote the continuation payo¤ at the end of the asymmetric phase, conditional on Cd (resp. Cc): Since player 1 plays D for sure in the asymmetric phase, we have
Hence it su¢ces to establish that V 2 (Cd) ! 1 as ("; ») ! (0; 0): Write ¹ 2 (Cd) for the probability that player 1's continuation strategy is ¾ C ; given that º t¡1 = Cd: Since ¹ 2 (Cd)¸1
Hence if " + » is su¢ciently small and ± > l 1+l ; there exists a value ofw hich equates W 2 (C) and
; and player 2's payo¤ converges to zero:
If À ! 1; player 1's per-period payo¤ tends to (1 + g) in the asymmetric phase, and 1 in the cooperative phase. By substituting for the limiting value of¸which is
; we see that player 1's payo¤ converges to 1+g+l 1+l : (We shall establish later that À ! 1):
We now verify that each player plays optimally at each information set in this equilibrium. In the asymmetric phase, this is so for player 2 by construction, since he is indi¤erent between C and D: It is easy to see that player 1 also plays optimally in the asymmetric phase, since she is choosing her one shot best response. 6 Consider now the transition to the cooperative phase, i.e. the player's actions in the …rst period after the sunspot signals at the end of the asymmetric phase. Since players only condition on their private information in the previous period, we may focus on this alone. Player 1 has two possible information sets, (Dc) and (Dd); whereas player 2 has four possible information sets. Let ¹ i (º) denote the probability assigned by player i to her opponent's continuation strategy being ¾ C ; given that i is at information set º:
As in the previous section, we shall assume that maxf"; »g < 1 6 : Furthermore, as in the previous section, we assume that ¼(±; "; ») 2 ( 1 2 ; µ) -this assumption on ¼ does not imply any restrictions upon g or l: However, if we invoke the assumption g¸l in A2, then we may also choose ¼ to be arbitrarily close to its upper bound. We shall also assume that À 2 (¼; µ("; »)): Since µ ! 1 as ("; ») ! (0; 0) we can also have À ! 1:
Consider …rst the beliefs of player 2: Let ¹ 2 (:) denote the probability assigned by 2 to the event that 1's continuation strategy is ¾ C : Since player 1 plays ¾ C at Dc and ¾ D at Dd; and since player 1 does not play C in the asymmetric phase, we have
Since ¼ < µ; it is optimal to continue with ¾ C today at information set Cd. Further, we have
Hence it is optimal for player 2 to switch to the defection phase if he receives the signal Cd at any date in the future.
At Dd; we have
This is clearly less than 1 2 since max f"; »g < 6 ; so that it is optimal to continue with ¾ D :
Consider now the beliefs of player 2 at (Cc) and (Dc); i.e. at the information sets where player 2 knows that there has been at least one error in the signals.
Recall that player 2 plays ¾ D at least at one of these information sets, since the above probabilities cannot be both greater than ¼; since this is greater than one-half. Hence there are three possibilities: either both ¹ 2 (Dc) and ¹ 2 (Cc) are less than ¼; or exactly one of these is greater than ¼: Now if ¹ 2 (:) < ¼ at any information set, it is optimal to continue with ¾ D today, and at every future date. Hence it remains to verify the case when ¹ 2 (:)¸¼: Suppose that » »+" > ¼; so that player 2 plays ¾ C at Dc: If » »+" · µ; lemma 2 veri…es that it is optimal to continue with ¾ C in this case. Hence consider the case where » »+" > µ: We have that ¹ > µ ) Â Cc (¹) < ¹: Further, since Â Cd is an increasing function, it su¢ces to verify that Â Cd (
This is less than 1 2 if maxf"; »g is less than 1 6 : Hence player 2's continuation strategy is optimal at Dc:
Finally, we consider the case where that player 2 plays ¾ C at Cc; i.e. when " "+» > ¼: Note that in this case A1 is violated. Hence we assume A2, which ensures that we can make ¼ arbitrarily close to its upper bound µ by selecting ± su¢ciently close to g 1+g : We can …nd a value of ¼ such that
is less than the upper bound for ¼; i.e.
It is easily veri…ed that the inequality above is ensured by condition A2. Consider now the beliefs of player 1: Her beliefs will depend upon player 2's strategy, which in turn depends upon the parameters of the signal distribution, and as we have seen, there are three possible cases.
Consider …rst the case where 2 plays ¾ C only at information set Cd:
Note that the expression is such that ¹ 1 (Dc) = Â Cc (À), where Â Cc is the belief revision operator de…ned in the previous section. Hence it follows that if À 2 [ ¼; µ); it follows that Â k Cc (À) 2 (¼; µ); 8k; and hence it is optimal for player 1 to continue with ¾ C at every information set. Consider 1's beliefs at (Dd): Once again, it is easy to verify that ¹ 1 (Dd) = Â Cd (À); and since À < µ; it is optimal to continue with ¾ D at this information set.
Consider next the case where ¾ 2 (Cd) = ¾ 2 (Cc) = ¾ C and ¾ 2 (Dd) = ¾ 2 (Dc) = ¾ D : In this case, assumption A2 applies, so that we may choose ¼ close to its upper bound. We have
If À > ¼; then ¹ 1 (Dc) > ¼ so that it is optimal to start by playing ¾ C in this case. To see that player 1 will …nd it optimal to switch to ¾ D on receiving a bad signal, note that requires
Now if ¹ 1 (Dc) · µ; lemma 2 has veri…ed that a player who begins with ¾ C will switch to ¾ D on receiving signal Cd in any subsequent period. If ¹ 1 (Dc) > µ; it su¢ces to verify that Â Cd (¹ 1 (Dc)) < µ; which is the upper bound for ¼: This yields the condition
Since À < µ; this condition is also satis…ed. Finally, we consider the case where
Hence it su¢ces to evaluate Â Cd at the upper bound, which yields
Hence Â Cd (¹ 1 (Dc)) < and " and » su¢ciently small), and the payo¤ (0; 0) is a static Nash payo¤. Since any payo¤ individually rational feasible payo¤ is a convex combination of these payo¤s, and can be achieved via public randomization, we have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 7
Assume that Assumption A is satis…ed, and players observe a public randomization device, then for any individually rational feasible payo¤ vector u = (u 1 ; u 2 ) and any number ³ > 0, there exist "(³) > 0; »(³) > 0 such that there exists a sequential equilibrium with payo¤s within ³ distance of u provided that " < "(³) and » < »(³) and ± > maxf g 1+g ; l 1+l g: This result is most closely related to those obtained in a paper by Piccione [12] , who also analyzes the prisoners' dilemma with imperfect private monitoring. Our results di¤er, both in terms of substance and in the techniques/strategies used. Piccione's substantive results are that full cooperation can always be approximated, and further, any individually rational feasible payo¤ can be approximated in a class of prisoners' dilemma games, i.e. for games where l¸g: The "folk theorem" condition A in the present paper is, in a sense, the opposite of Piccione's condition. More recently, Ely and Välimäki [5] have considerably simpli…ed the technique used in Piccione, and generalized the folk theorem obtained there. We shall discuss the di¤erences between the approach of the present paper and the approach of Piccione and Ely-Välimäki in the concluding section.
The n-player case
In this section, we extend the approximate e¢ciency result to the n-player case. Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng be the set of players and G be the stage game played by those players. The stage game G is as follows. Player i chooses an action a i from the action set A i = fC; Dg : Actions are not observable to the other players and taken simultaneously. A n-tuple action pro…le is denoted by a 2 A = n ¦ i=1 A i : An action pro…le of all players but player i is a ¡i 2 ¦ j6 =i
Each player receives an (n ¡ 1)-tuple private signal pro…le about all the other players' actions. Let ! i = (! i;1 ; :::; ! i;i¡1 ; ! i;i+1; :::; ! i;n ) 2 fc; dg n¡1 = -i be a generic signal received by player i where ! i;j stands for player i's signal about player j 0 s action: A generic signal pro…le is denoted by ! = (! 1 ; :::; ! n ) 2 -. All players have the same payo¤ function u. Player i's payo¤ u (a i ; ! i ) depends on her own action a i and private signal ! i . Other players' actions a¤ect a player i's payo¤ only through the distribution over the signal which player i receives. The distribution conditional on a is denoted by p (!ja). It is assumed that p (!ja) are full support distributions, that is, p (!ja) > 0 8a8!: The space of a set of full support distributions fp (!ja)g a2A is denoted by P:
We also introduce the perfectly informative signal distribution P 0 = fp 0 (!ja)g a2A , where, for any a 2 A; p 0 (!ja) = 1 if ! i = a ¡i for all i. The whole space of the information structure P S P 0 is endowed with the Euclidean norm.
Since we are interested in the situation where information is almost perfect, we restrict attention mainly to a subset of P where information is almost perfect. Information is almost perfect when every person's signal pro…le is equal to the actual action pro…le with probability larger than 1 ¡ " for some small number ":
To sum up, the space of the information structure we deal with in this section is the following subset of P :
and we use p " for a generic element of P " : A player's realized payo¤ only depends on the number of bad signals d that a player receives. Let d (! i ) be the number of d contained in
; which is strictly positive for all µ: The largest deviation gain and the smallest deviation gain is g and g respectively, where g = max 0·k·n¡1 g (k) and g = min
We impose the following symmetry assumption on p " ; 
; where the probability measure on H t i is generated by (¾; p). For this n-player repeated prisoner's dilemma, ¾ C and ¾ D are de…ned as the partial continuation strategies which are realization equivalent to the following grim trigger strategy and permanent defection respectively: This grim trigger strategy is the harshest one among all the variations of grim trigger strategies in the n player case. Players using ¾ C switch to ¾ D as soon as they observe any signal pro…le which is not fully cooperative. When player i is mixing ¾ C and ¾ D with probability (¹ i ; 1 ¡ ¹ i ) ; that strategy is denoted by
Suppose that either ¾ C or ¾ D is chosen in the …rst period by all players. Let µ 2 £ be the number of players using ¾ D as a continuation strategy among n players. Then a probability measure ¹ ¡i (h t i ; p) on the space £ = f0; 1; :::; n ¡ 1g is derived conditional on the realization of the private history h t i : Clearly, this measure also depends on the initial level of mixture between ¾ C and ¾ D by every player, but this dependence is not shown explicitly as it is obvious. Let U be the space of such probability measures, which is an n ¡ 1 dimensional simplex.
In the two player case, a player's strategy is represented as a function of belief, using the fact that the other player is always playing either ¾ C or ¾ D on and o¤ the equilibrium path. Note that the space of the other players' "types" is much larger. However, there is a convenient way to summarize relevant information. We classify £ into two sets; f0g and f1; :::; n ¡ 1g ; that is, the state no one have ever switched to ¾ D and the state where there is at least one player who has already switched to ¾ D . Player i 0 s conditional subjective probability that no player has started using ¾ D is denoted by Á ¡ ¹ ¡i ¢ = ¹ ¡i (0) given ¹ ¡i 2 U: The reason why we just focus on this number is that the exact number of players who are playing ¾ D does not make much di¤erence to what will happen in the future given that everyone is playing ¾ C . As soon as someone starts playing ¾ D , every other player starts playing ¾ D with very high probability from the very next period on by the assumption of almost perfect monitoring. What is important is not how many players have switched to ¾ D ; but whether anyone has switched to ¾ D or not.
Finally, let V (¾ i ; µ : p; ±) be player i's discounted average payo¤ when µ other players are playing ¾ D and n ¡ µ ¡ 1 other players are playing ¾ C : We need the following notations:
Belief Dynamics and Best Response
For the two player case, the equilibrium strategy was described as a mapping from U to 4A i . The equilibrium strategy we will construct here has a similar structure except that belief lies in a larger space. It has the following expression:
where U C ; U I ; U D are mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets in U; and ¼ means playing C with probability ¼ and playing D with probability 1 ¡ ¼:
In order to verify that ½ is a Nash equilibrium and achieves the approximate e¢cient payo¤, we strengthen the path dominance argument used in Sekiguchi [13] instead of appealing to the one-shot deviation argument used in the previous sections. The argument is devided into several steps. First step is to give an almost complete characterization of the unique optimal action as a function of belief. As a next step, we analyze the dynamics of belief by introducing natural assumptions on the information structure when players are playing either ¾ C or ¾ D : The third step is to check consistency of this strategy pro…le, that is, to check if players are actually playing either ¾ C or ¾ D by following ½ ¡ ¹ ¡i ¢ . Once it is established that ½ is a Nash equilibrium, then we can use the fact that there exists a sequential equilibrium which is realization equivalent to a Nash equilibrium if the game is of non-observable deviation. Finally, as in the two player case, we can use a public randomization device or divide the original repeated game to component repeated games to implement the same payo¤ for large ±.
After we prove the existence of sequential equilibrium which is realization equivalent to ½ ¡ ¹ ¡i ¢ and approximates the e¢cient outcome, we show, with one more assumption, that ½ ¡ ¹ ¡i ¢ itself is actually a sequential equilibrium.
The unique optimal action is indeed shown to have exactly the same form as ½ ¡ ¹ ¡i ¢ for a certain range of ± if monitoring is almost perfect.
Before analyzing the unique optimal action, we …rst extend one property which holds in the two player case to the n¡player case. In the two player case, the di¤erence in payo¤s by ¾ C and ¾ D is linear and there is a unique ¼ (±; "; ») where a player is indi¤erent between ¾ C and ¾ D with perfect monitoring. When the number of players is more than two; the corresponding object
¢ is a slightly more complex. Even when players randomize independently and symmetrically playing ¾ C with probability ¹ and ¾ D with probability
1+g (0) ; it is possible to show that there exists a unique ¹ 2 (0; 1) such that
1+g(0) ; there exists a unique ¹ ¤ 2 (0; 1) such that
f (0) < 0 and f is continuous, existence of such ¹ is guaranteed. To show uniqueness, we prove f (¹) = 0 )
Since 4V (µ : p 0 ; ±) < 0 for µ¸1; The following lemma extends a useful property in the two player case to the n player case.
Actually, it is easy to see that the former converges to the latter uniformly in ¹ as " ! 0:
7 Hence, we can …nd ¼ (±; p " ) in the neighborfood of ¼ (±; p 0 ) when monitoring is almost perfect. Now we derive the unique optimal action as a function of
and only if C is the unique optimal action for this belief ¹ ¡i : We show that the unique optimal action with almost perfect monitoring is almost the same. So, this result is essentially the Maximum theorem in the sense that the optimal choice is "continuous". As a …rst step, the following lemma shows that ¾ D is optimal if a player knows that someone has switched to the permanent defection and " is small.
Lemma 10 There exists a b
Proof. Take ¾ D and any strategy which starts with C. The least deviation gain is (1 ¡ ±) g: The largest loss caused by the di¤erence in continuation payo¤s with ¾ D and the latter strategy is ±"V : Setting b " small enough guarantees that (1 ¡ ±) g > ±"V for any " 2 (0; b ") : Then, D must be the optimal action for any such ": Since players are using ¾ D , ¹ ¡i (µ) = 1 for some µ 6 = 0 in the next period. This implies that D is the unique optimal action in all the following periods. ¥ Using p (¢j¢) and given the fact that all players are playing either ¾ C or ¾ D ; we de…ne a transition probability of the number of players who have switched to ¾ D : Let q (ljm) be a probability that l players will play ¾ D from the next period when m players are playing ¾ D now. In other words, this q (ljm) is a probability that l ¡ m players playing C receive the signal d when n ¡ m players play C and m players play D: Of course, q (ljm) > 0 if l = m and q (ljm) = 0 if l < m.
The following lemma provides various informative and useful bounds on the variations of discounted average payo¤s caused by introducing small imperfectness in private monitoring.
Lemma 11
7 Also note that convergence of V ¡ ¾ i ; ¹ ¡i : p"; ± ¢ to V ¡ ¾ i ; ¹ ¡i : p 0 ; ± ¢ is independent of the choice of the associated sequence fp"g because of the de…nition of P".
1+g(0) ; 1´; There exists a " > 0 such that for any " 2 [0; "] ;
Proof.
(1): For any " 2 (0; 1) and p " 2 P " ;
1+g(0) ; 1´; it is easy to check that V (¾ C ; 0 :
for any p " and (ii) " < b ": Let ¾ ¤ 0 be the optimal strategy given that everyone is using ¾ C : 
In this inequality, the second component represents what player i could get if she knew the true continuation strategies of her opponents at each possible state. To see that this additional information is valuable, suppose that the continuation strategy of ¾ 
Since this contradicts the optimality of ¾ ¤ 0 ; ¾ ¤ 0 has to assign C for the …rst period. Now,
So,
This implies that sup ¾i;p"2P"
(1) means that a small departure from the perfect monitoring does not reduce the payo¤ of ¾ C much when all the other players are using ¾ C . (2) means that there is not much to be exploited by using other strategies than ¾ C with a small imperfection in the private signal as long as all the other players are using a ¾ C .
The following result is an almost complete characterization of the optimal action as a function of ¹ ¡i .
Proposition 12 Given ±; for any´> 0; there exists a " > 0 such that for any p " ; ² it is not optimal to play C for player i if
It is not optimal to play C if
s satis…ed because then any strategy which plays C now is dominated by
By Lemma 11.2., this inequality is satis…ed for any " 2 [0; "] and any p " if
such that C is not optimal for any p " 0 (±;´;¹ ¡i ) and any
(2): It is not optimal to play D if
this inequality is satis…ed for " 2 (0; 1) and any p " if
such that D is not optimal for any p " 2 P " 00 (±;´;¹ ¡i ) and any ¹ 0 ¡i around ¹ ¡i : Again, " 00 ¡ ±;´; ¹ ¡i ¢ can be set independent of ¹ ¡i :
Finally, setting " (±;´) = min f" 0 (±;´) ; " 00 (±;´)g completes the proof. ¥ This proposition implies that the optimal action can be completely characterized except for an arbitrary small area around the manifold satisfying
¢ in a n ¡ 1 dimensional simplex; where player i is indi¤erent between ¾ C and ¾ D with perfect monitoring, but we also characterize the optimal action for this region later. Although this argument is essentially the path dominance argument used in Sekiguchi [13] for n = 2, it extends that argument to the n¡player case and provides a sharper characterization even for n = 2:
An immediate corollary of this proposition is that C is the unique optimal action given that Á is su¢ciently close to 1, ± > g (0) 1+g(0) ; and " is small:
1+g(0) ; there exists Á > 0 and " > 0 such that for any p " ; it is not optimal for player i to play
Since the optimal action is almost characterized as a function of ¹ ¡i ; now we need to know the dynamics of ¹ ¡i associated with ¾ C and ¾ D . Given the optimal action shown above, what we need for consistency is that ¹ ¡i stays in the "C area" described by Proposition 12 as long as player i has observed fully cooperative signals from the beginning and ¹ ¡i stays in the "D area" once player i received a bad signal and started playing defection for herself.
Let
When k and " is small, W k just covers the region where C is the unique optimal action and the unique optimal action is indeterminate. We show that Á t+n is always above Á 2 (0; 1) if a player plays C, observes c; Á t 2 W k , and monitoring is almost perfect.
Lemma 14 For any
there exists e " such that for any " 2
This function is increasing in Á ¢ for any n = 1; 2; :::: On the other hand, if
is always above Á:¥ The above lemma guarantees that players are con…dent that the other players are cooperating after they observed a stream of cooperative signals and played C all the time. The next lemma is used to show that player i plays ¾ D once a bad signal is observed or D has been played in the previous period. Let us de…ne°p " 2 (0; 1) as the smallest number such that
where
A j is a mapping such that f j (! j ) = D if and only if ! j 6 = c: The …rst condition implies that Á i will be below°p " even if it is the …rst time for a player to observe anything other than c while C has been played. The second condition means that Á i will be below°p " independent of the signal received when D is played. We impose the following regularity condition on the information structure we focus.
Assumption B: For some°< 1;°=°p " .
Note that this assumption is not satis…ed in the two player case in the previous sections. For example, Â Cd (1) or Â Dd (1) can be arbitrary close to 1 even if monitoring is almost perfect. However, we don't need this assumption when n = 2: This assumption helps us to establish our result for n = 3: The following is an example of information structure which satis…es this assumption when n = 3 independent of " 9 :
Example: Totally Decomposable Case
f (! i;j ja j ) for all a 2 A and ! 2 -where f (!ja) is a distribution function on fc; dg such that ! = a with very high probability. Given the action by player j; the probability that player i 6 = j receives the right signal or the wrong signal about player j's action is the same across i 6 = j. Also note that players' signals are conditionally independent over players.
The next lemma is an easy consequence of this assumption. 
¢ ¢
Proof. See appendix. 9 An example of a more general class of p" which satis…es this assumption independent of the level of " can be found in Obara [10] .
Construction of Sequential Equilibrium
Let us introduce the following notations:
These are subsets of the belief space U. U I " is a manifold where player i is indi¤erent between ¾ C and ¾ D : In particular, ¹
Now de…ne ½ as a mapping from ¹ ¡i 2 U to 4 fC; Dg in the following way:
We know from Proposition 12 that this function assigns the best response action almost everywhere except for a neighborhood of
¢ to construct a Nash equilibrium approximating the e¢cient outcome, for which there exists a realization equivalent sequential equilibrium. All we have to do is to make sure that players are actually playing either ¾ C or ¾ D on the equilibrium path after they initially randomize between C and D.
Proposition 16 Suppose that Assumption B is satis…ed. Then there exists a
1+g(0) ; 1´such that for any ± 2
1+g(0) ; ±´there is a " (±) > 0 where, for any p " ; there exists a symmetric sequential equilibrium which is realization equiv-
Proof. Pick any ± > g(0)
First we prove that if Á i 5°; then D is the unique optimal action, hence the optimal continuation strategy is ¾ D when " is small enough.
Note that player i is indi¤erent between ¾ C and ¾ D with belief Á i = ¹ ¼ ¡i (p 0 ; ±) (0) with no noise, hence the following equality holds.
¹ ¡i (p 0 ; ±) (µ) 4V (µ : p 0 ; ±) < 0 by comparing it to the above equality. If player i plays C here, then the positive payo¤ player i can get when µ = 0 decreases by at least ¡ ¹ ¼ ¡i (p 0 ; ±) (0) ¡°¢ 4V (µ : p 0 ; ±) compared to the case when Á i = ¹ ¼ ¡i (p 0 ; ±) (0) : On the other hand, the additional gain from playing C when Á i 5°and µ 6 = 0 is bounded above by
1+g(0) by Lemma 9, playing C is strictly dominated when ± is chosen to be close to
1+g(0) . Any strategy playing C now continues to be dominated by ¾ D even monitoring is almost perfect by the same argument as in Lemma 11 10 . Now we check players' incentive on the equilibrium path to prove that ½
¢ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Players randomize between C and D with probabiity ¼ (±; p " ) ; 1 ¡ ¼ (±; p " ) respectively in the …rst period. First of all, Á i is strictly above Á as long as (C; c) has been observed by Lemma 14. C is the unique optimal action for such Á i by Lemma 13. Next, when a player …rst observes (C; ! (6 = c)) after the second period, Á i gets below°by Lemma 15. Hence, the unique optimal action is D by the above argument: If (C; ! (6 = c)) is observed in the …rst period; then Á i is again clearly below°for small " because ! is interpreted as a signal of ¾ D being chosen in the …rst period rather than an error. So, D is always the unique optimal action after this kind of history which ends with (C; ! (6 = c)) : Finally, when D is played, it is always the case that Á i 5°in the next period; hence the unique optimal action is again D: These imply that ¹ ¡i 2 U 
¢ is a symmetric Nash equilibrium, which is clearly
Existence of a sequential equilibrium which is realization equivalent to ½
follows from the fact that this game is in a class of games with non-observable deviation. See Sekiguchi [13] for detail.¥ Since the probability that everyone chooses ¾ C in this sequential equilibrium; ¼ (±; p " ) n¡1 ; gets closer to 1 as ± gets closer to
1+g(0) by Lemma 9, an outcome arbitrary close to the e¢cient outcome can be achieved for ± arbitrary close to
1+g(0) . For high ±; we can use a public randomization device again to reduce ± e¤ectively or use Ellison's trick as in Ellison [4] to achieve an almost e¢cient outcome although the strategy is more complex and no longer a grim trigger. Hence, the following result is obtained.
1+g(0) ; 1´: Then for any ¿ > 0; there is a " > 0 such that for any p " ; there exists a sequential equilibrium whose symmetric equilibrium payo¤ is more than 1 ¡ ¿ :
¢ itself is actually sequential equilibrium with one more assumption:
Proposition 18 Suppose that Assumption B and C is satis…ed. For any ± 2 ³ g(0)
1+g ( : We prove that D is the unique optimal action in this region if " is su¢ciently small. If a player plays C, then Lemma 14 and Assumption C imply that the continuation strategy is ¾ C for small ". This is because Á i > Á (±) as long as (C; c) realizes and Á i 5°holds otherwise. Since ¾ C is dominated by ¾ D in this region, the unique optimal action should be D:
Similarly, take any ¹ ¡i such that 
Concluding Comments
The main point of this paper has been to develop "belief-based" strategies as a way of constructing sequential equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring. This a¤ords a major simpli…cation as compared to the traditional method of analysis. While our construction has been restricted to the prisoners' dilemma, and to a strategy pro…le which consists only of two continuation strategies, the idea underlying this simpli…cation is generalizable. If player i starts with a …nitely complex (mixed) strategy which induces k possible continuation strategies, then the state space or the set of possible beliefs for player j for the entire repeated game is a k ¡ 1 dimensional simplex.
The approach of the present paper is based on generalizing "trigger strategy" equilibria to the private monitoring context. Under perfect or imperfect public monitoring, such trigger strategy can be constructed so as to provide strict incentives for players to continue with their equilibrium actions at each information set. Mailath and Morris [8] show that one can construct equilibria which provide similar strict incentives under private monitoring which is "almost-public". However, if private signals are not su¢ciently correlated, pure trigger strategy pro…les fail to be equilibria. The approach in the present paper, as in previous works such as Bhaskar and van Damme [3] and Sekiguchi [13] , relies on approximating the grim trigger strategy with a mixed strategy. In the basic construction, a player is indi¤erent between cooperating and defecting in the initial period, but has strict incentives to play the equilibrium action at every subsequent information set. In particular, player i's strategy is measurable with respect to her beliefs about player j's continuation strategy. As Bhaskar [2] shows, such mixed strategies are robust to a small amount of incomplete payo¤ information as in Harsanyi's [6] . In particular, Bhaskar [2] shows in the context of the repeated prisoners' dilemma, where stage game payo¤s are random and private, there exists a strict equilibrium with behavior corresponding to that of the mixed equilibrium of the present paper. 11 In the intial period, a player plays C for some realizations of his private payo¤ information, and D for other realizations, and continues with a trigger strategy in subsequent periods, independent of their payo¤ information.
The alternative approach to constructing non-trivial repeated game equilibria with private monitoring is due to Piccione [12] and Ely and Välimäki [5] 12 . This approach relies on using player j's mixed strategy to make a player i indi¤erent between playing C and D at every information set. Since player i is so indi¤erent, she is likewise willing to randomize so as to make j also indi¤er-ent between his actions at each information set. In this approach, beliefs are irrelevant, since a player's continuation payo¤ function does not depend upon her beliefs. Such equilibria seem to be less likely to survive if there is private payof information, and indeed this question is the subject of current research.
Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 9. We just need to show that @¼(±;p0) @± j ±= g(0) 1+g(0) < 0 using the implicit function theorem. Since,
This result is relevant since Bhaskar [1] considers a overlapping generations game with private monitoring and shows that incomplete payo¤ information as in Harsanyi implies an anti-folk theorem -players must play Nash equilibrium of the stage game in every period. 12 See also the work of Kandori [7] in the context of a …nitely repeated game.
a straightforward calculation gives the desired result as follows. < 0
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Proof of Lemma 15
Suppose that h 
